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Discussion Topics
• TOE overview
– Separation Kernel (SK)
– Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP)
• Assurance issues for High Robustness
– Platform Assurance
– Trusted Initialization
– Trusted Recovery 
• SKPP extended requirements
• Conclusion and plans
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Separation Kernel
• Introduced by Rushby (1981)
• Simpler than traditional security kernels
• Primary functional properties
– Separate system resources into security policy equivalence 
classes, i.e., partitions
– Control information flows between and within partitions
• Configuration data establishes
– Binding of resources to partitions
– Policy rules for information flow control
• No support for MAC labels but can be configured to 
control information flows in a manner consistent with 
a MLS policy
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Least Privilege Separation Kernel
• Refinement of separation kernel 
• Apply Principle of Least Privilege to further 
restrict access to resources 
– Basic SK:  homogeneous resource-access 
requirements 
• Same access authorizations for all subjects in a partition
– Least Privilege SK:  heterogeneous resource-
access requirements
• Separate access authorizations for different subjects in a 
partition
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High Robustness
• Robustness – US scheme only
– Metric for TOE’s protection ability 
– Degrees of robustness:  Basic, Medium, High
• Assurance level
• Strength of security functions
• Robustness requirement for a TOE
– Based on value of data and threats in operational 
environment
• High robustness
– Provides most stringent protection
– Can counter sophisticated, well-funded attacks
– Suitable to protect high value data
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Separation Kernel Protection Profile 
• U.S. Government Protection Profile for Separation 
Kernels in Environments Requiring High Robustness
– Validated in July 2007 (Version 1.03, 29 June 2007)
• Based on Common Criteria Version 2.3
• Assurance requirements
– Combination of CC-defined components for EAL6 and EAL7
– Two types of explicitly stated components
• Modifications of existing CC requirements
• New requirements
→ No EAL claim due to these extensions
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Security Concepts in SKPP
• Enforcement of Partition Information Flow Policy
– Partition Abstraction, Least Privilege Abstraction  
• TOE configuration change
– Four models:  offline, static, constrained, unconstrained
• Establishment of initial secure state
– Achieved through different degrees of assurance levied on 
non-TSF components
• Delivery mechanisms
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Platform Assurance Issues
• High robustness requires hardware-supported 
domain separation and self-protection mechanisms
• No CC-defined requirements for hardware 
assurance 
• Difficult to produce assurance evidence for 
hardware at same level of detail as software
• Need an assurance framework 
– To assess security properties of hardware mechanisms 
based on their interfaces to software
– To establish trust in security-relevant hardware mechanisms 
– To address hardware obsolescence during and after TOE 
evaluation
→ New Class APT -- Platform Assurance
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Platform Concepts
• Platform = hardware + associated firmware
• Platform component 
– Independently procurable, mass-produced, non-specialized 
• TOE platform = one or more platform components
– Defined by ST author
• Platform definition can vary based on intended usage of the 
TOE
– Very restrictive: require a specific component type with exact 
properties
– Less restrictive:  allow variations in properties of a specific 
component type
– More open:  allow use of different component types with defined 
assembly rules 
• Platform interface
– Internal:  accessible only to TOE components 
– External:  accessible to both TOE components and entities outside 
the TOE
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Trusted Initialization Issues
• CC Version 2.x defines no requirements for TOE 
initialization
– Rely on administrative actions to ensure proper TOE 
initialization
• Intended usage of SK requires autonomous TOE 
initialization
• TSF cannot initialize itself
– Formal model assumes TSF starts in an initial secure state
• Need a robust mechanism to 
– Establish execution environment for the TSF
– Bring the TSF to an initial secure state defined by 
configuration data
• Generation and loading of configuration data need 
commensurable assurance
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SKPP Approach to TOE Initialization
• Correct TOE initialization is achieved through a trust 
chain of non-TSF functions 
– Delivery
– Configuration data generation
– TOE loading 
– Initialization
• Require use of standardized cryptographic 
algorithms for trusted delivery
– American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
– National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST)
• Apply different developmental assurance measures 
to other initialization-related functions
→ New assurance ADV families
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Trusted Recovery Issues
• CC requirements emphasize ways to handle failures 
and discontinuities
– Manual versus automated
• CC is vague about presence of recovery functions 
while in maintenance mode
– “In the maintenance mode, normal operation might be 
impossible or severely restricted, as otherwise insecure 
situations might occur.”
• Verification of robustness of recovery mechanisms is 
difficult
– Failures/discontinuities have no formal properties
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SKPP Approach to Trusted Recovery
• Focus on protecting the TSF against further 
compromise during a recovery 
• Extend FPT_RCV to require the TSF to attempt 
recovery to a secure state upon detection of an 
insecure state
• Expand definition of maintenance mode
– “A contiguous period during an execution session when 
operational mode functions are restricted, or recovery 
functions are available that are not available during 
operational mode, or both.”
• Clarify intended use of maintenance mode 
– Enable the TOE to return to a secure state
– Prevent the TOE from entering an insecure state 
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SKPP Extended Requirements
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Platform Assurance (APT)
• New assurance class with five families
– Platform Definition (APT_PDF)
– Platform Specification (APT_PSP)
– Platform Conformance Testing (APT_PCT)
– Platform Security Testing (APT_PST)
– Platform Vulnerability Assessment (APT_PVA)
• Focus on specifications instead of identifications of components
• Replace a subset of ADV, ATE and AVA requirements for COTS 
components
– Specialized components by TOE developer must meet all ADV, ATE and 
AVA requirements defined for software
• ACM, ADO_DEL and ALC requirements only apply to specialized 
components 
– Information about CM, delivery, development security are not generally 
available for COTS components
• Does not address physical protection and anti-tampering issues
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Platform Definition (APT_PDF)
• Require Platform Definition Document (PDD) to 
support component-specific security analysis 
against SFRs 
• PDD can include vendor documentation if they meet 
content requirements
• PDD include
– Component types and assembly rules
– Identification of component interface specifications for all 
interfaces
– Security analysis on how each component type interacts 
with the TOE
– Precise references to component interfaces so that 
specifications can be obtained by third-party
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Platform Specification (APT_PSP)






– Invocation methods, parameters, expected results, error 
conditions
– Arguments that all interfaces are included in specifications
• Support functional analysis and vulnerability 
assessment of the TOE
8/29/2007 22Department of Computer Science
Platform Conformance Testing (APT_PCT)
• Require functional testing to ensure platform 
components identified in PDD operate as 
expected
– Vendor-provided tests may be used to satisfy this 
requirement 
• Require exercising all security features that 
are relied upon by the TSF
– Testing is performed through TSF interfaces
– Tests are to be developed by TOE developer
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Platform Security Testing (APT_PST)
• Require comprehensive security testing
– Verify correct operations of all external and 
internal platform interfaces
• Tests to be performed at the component 
interface level 
– Different than tests in APT_PCT which are at TSF 
interface level
• Test documentation include
– Procedures and expected results
– Argument that test coverage is complete
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Platform Vulnerability Assessment (APT_PVA)
• Performed as part of TOE vulnerability analysis 
• Assessment is at platform interface level
– All external platform interfaces
– All internal platform interfaces used by the TOE
• Complement AVA_VLA requirements
– Systematic search for vulnerabilities
– Disposition of identified vulnerabilities
– Justification that analysis is complete
– Independent vulnerability analysis by NSA
– Independent penetration testing by NSA
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Trusted Initialization (ADV_INI)
• New family in Class ADV
• Levy both functional and assurance requirements on 
initialization function
– Initialization has both testable behaviors and development 
process
– SFR paradigm is not applicable to non-TSF components
• Functional responsibilities of initialization function
– Establish the TSF in an initial secure state
– Verify integrity of TSF code and data during initialization 
– Handle failures during initialization
– Provide self-protection during initialization 
– No arbitrary interaction with the TSF after initialization
• Require cooperation from TSF to prevent rogue initialization 
function
– Extended SFR requires secure state confirmation by TSF prior to TSP 
enforcement (FPT_ESS_EXP)
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Development Assurance for Initialization
• Architecture assurance
– Self-protection against tampering from other TOE components
– No interaction with TSF operations after initialization
• Functional specification 
– Similar to ADV_FSP requirements for TSF
– Describe each initialization interface
• Purpose, method of use, parameters, operations, exceptions, error 
messages and effects
• Design documentation
– One level of specification, i.e., not as rigorous as ADV_HLD and
ADV_LLD for TSF
– Require modular composition of components




– Test plan, test procedures, expected results, actual results
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Configuration Tool Design (ADV_CTD)
• Configuration vector(s) define the initial secure state 
– Corrupted vector could result in unintended TSF operations
• Need robust Configuration Tool to generate and validate 
configuration vector(s)
• ADV_CTD levies both functional and assurance requirements 
on Configuration Tool
• Configuration Tool capabilities
– Generate human-readable form of configuration vectors with 
clear semantics to allow validation of intended TOE configuration
– Preserve semantics of data during conversion between human-
readable and machine-readable forms of configuration vectors
– Apply cryptographic seal(s) on generated configuration vector(s)
• Design documentation
– Explain how to verify correctness and accuracy of generated 
configuration vector(s)  
– Same level of abstraction and detail required by ADV_HLD
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Load Tool Design (ADV_LTD)
• Similar to ADV_CTD
– Include both functional and assurance requirements
• TOE loading function needs to be robust
– Part of the chain of trust to establish initial secure state
– Must maintain integrity of TOE software and configuration 
vector(s)
• Load Tool capabilities
– Convert TOE software and configuration vector(s) into a 
TOE-usable form
– Preserve integrity of code and data during conversion
• Design documentation
– Explain the conversion process
– Same level of abstraction and detail required by ADV_HLD
8/29/2007 29Department of Computer Science
Trusted Recovery (FPT_RCV)
• Extend base FPT_RCV.2 component
• TSF must attempt recovery to a secure state upon detection of 
being in an insecure state
– After completion of TOE initialization
– During execution session
• TSF must attempt to halt if unable to complete recovery action
– Transition to maintenance mode may be an acceptable action for 
certain TOEs
• ST enumerates pair-wise recovery conditions and associated 
actions
– Recovery is implementation-specific
• Require assurance evidence that secure state results from the 
identified action
– TSF design specifications
– Administrative guidance documentation
– Test analysis documentation
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Conclusion and plans
• Assurance considerations for high robustness not 
sufficient as addressed in CC Version 2.3
– Platform assurance, trusted initialization, trusted recovery
• SKPP explicitly defined SFRs and SARs to address 
these issues for a separation kernel TOE type
• Most of these extended requirements are applicable 
to other high assurance TOE types
• Next step for this PP development team
– Development of another high robustness PP for a more 
complex TOE
• Leverage SKPP experience to shorten PP engineering time
– Challenge is to articulate high robustness requirements in 
CC Version 3.1 context
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